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Abstract	
We	used	dual	electroencephalography	(EEG)	to	measure	brain	activity	
simultaneously	in	pairs	of	trustors	and	trustees	playing	a	15-round	
economic	game	framed	as	a	“trust	game”	versus	a	“power	game”.	Four	
major	findings	resulted:	first,	earnings	in	each	round	were	higher	in	the	
trust	than	in	the	power	game.	Second,	in	the	trust	game,	reaction	time	for	
strategic	deliberations	was	significantly	longer	for	the	trustee	than	the	
trustor.	In	the	power	game,	however,	the	trustee	took	longer	to	think	
about	how	much	money	to	repay,	whereas	the	trustor	took	longer	to	think	
about	how	much	money	to	invest.	Third,	prediction	accuracy	for	the	
amount	exchanged	was	higher	in	the	trust	game	than	in	the	power	game.	
Fourth,	interbrain	synchronicity	gauged	with	the	phase-locking	value	of	
alpha	bands	in	the	brain	–	especially	the	frontal	and	central	regions	–	was	
higher	in	the	power	game	than	in	the	trust	game.	From	this	latter	finding	
we	infer	that	it	reflects	an	elevated	mutual	strategic	deliberation	in	the	
power	game.	These	behavioral	and	neuroscience-based	findings	give	a	
better	understanding	of	the	framing	effects	of	a	trust	game	on	the	strategic	
deliberations	of	both	trustor	and	trustee	seeking	to	attain	wealth.	
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1.	Introduction	
	
Social	interaction	and	the	formation	of	relationships	is	of	crucial	importance	for	human	
survival	and	the	collective	creation	of	wealth	(Beckes	and	Coan,	2011;	Lieberman,	2007;	2013).	
Rather	than	studying	persons	engaged	in	tasks	in	isolation,	such	as	passively	watching	visual	
expressions	of	facial	pictures	of	conspecifics	or	interacting	with	a	computer	during	an	economic	
game,	researchers	have	begun	taking	a	social	neuroscience	perspective	by	investigating	how	
individuals	interact	with	each	other	(Cacioppo,	et	al.,	2003;	Hasson	et	al.,	2012).	When	people	
interact	with	other	people	as	opposed	to	making	decisions	alone,	they	essentially	react	thoughtfully	
and	purposively	to	another	person’s	behavior.	This	is	reflected	in	the	relationship	arising	between	
the	subject	and	the	person	interacting	with	each	other.	For	neuroscientists	interested	in	
electroencephalography	(EEG),	this	requires	direct	observation	of	the	“interaction”	emerging	
between	the	brains	of	different	subjects	which	only	can	be	obtained	by	measuring	brain	activity	of	
the	subjects	simultaneously	during	tasks	(Babiloni	and	Astolfi,	2014,	p.	77).	Hence	researchers	use	
dual	EEG	or	hyperscanning	EEG	(e.g.,	Mu	et	al.,	2016;	Keller	et	al.,	2012;	Schilbach	et	al.,	2013)	when	
studying	the	degree	of	interbrain	synchronicity	during	social	tasks.	For	similar	developments	have	
been	taking	placed	within	fMRI-based	research	e.g.,	King-Casas	et	al.,	(2005).				
Most	studies	on	dual	EEG	focus	on	simple	coordination	tasks,	especially	motor	tasks	such	as	
button	pressing,	temporal	synchronicity	during	music	production,	transmitting	gestural	words	or	
emotions	by	facial	expression,	and	synchronicity	of	hand	movements	(see	Babiloni	and	Astolfi,	2014:	
Dumas	et	al.,	2010;	Kawasaki	et	al.,	2013).	It	is	apparent	that	during	coordination	tasks	interbrain	
synchronicity	occurs	mainly	between	prefrontal	cortices	as	these	regions	are	involved	in	perspective-
taking	and	theory	of	mind	(e.g.,	Cui	et	al.,	2012;	Sanfey	et	al.,	2003;	Ruby	and	Decety,	2004)	and	for	
social	tasks	the	alpha	bands	are	discerned	(Tognoli	et	al.,	2007;	Astolfi	et	al.,	2010).	Here	different	
patterns	of	alpha	band	interbrain	synchronicity	(e.g.,	high	versus	low	interbrain	synchronicity)	are	
associated	with	the	temporal	dynamics	of	interpersonal	coordination	such	as	found	in	cooperation	
versus	competition	tasks.	We	focus	on	a	coordination	task	involving	strategic	decision-making,	
during	which	the	value	associated	with	the	action	of	one	agent	depends	critically	on	the	changing	
actions	and	mental	states	of	other	social	agents.	
We	focus	specifically	on	interbrain	synchronicity	of	pairs	engaged	in	a	game	framed	as	either	
a	“trust	game”	or	a	“power	game”	(e.g.,	Johnson	and	Mislin,	2011;	Burnham,	et	al.,	2000).	In	both	
versions	of	the	game,	the	rules	are	identical:	the	trustor	decides	how	much	of	his	endowment	to	
invest	in	the	trustee,	who	receives	this	amount	in	each	round.	The	invested	amount	is	then	tripled,	
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after	which	the	trustee	decides	how	much	to	repay	the	trustor.	This	game	is	played	for	15	rounds,	
and	the	profits	from	both	trustor	and	trustee	are	added	up	for	every	round.	Hereunder	we	discuss	
how	framing	this	economic	game	as	a	trust	versus	power	game	affects	the	strategic	deliberations	of	
both	trustor	and	trustee.	Their	deliberations	involve	making	predictions	about	each	other	
exchanges,	perspective-taking	and	theory	of	mind	inferences	about	one	another	(Babiloni	and	
Astolfi,	2014).	Research	in	economic	games	has	shown	that	small	changes	in	the	experimental	
protocols,	such	as	framing	effects,	can	have	an	impact	on	the	behavior	of	both	players	in	the	lab	
(Johnson	and	Mislin,	2011,	p.	866).	For	instance	Burnham	et	al.	(2000)	created	frames	for	the	two	
participants	in	a	trust	game	using	the	primes	“partner”	versus	“opponent”	and	found	that	the	
trustworthiness	was	higher	in	the	participant	framed	as	the	partner.	We	add	to	this	literature	by	
studying	how	framing	the	game	as	a	trust	versus	power	game	not	only	affects	the	strategic	
deliberation	of	both	players	but	also	affects	their	interbrain	synchronicity.	The	insights	gained	allow	
us	to	obtain	a	deeper	understanding	of	how	the	framing	effects	of	a	trust	game	affects	how	people	
create	personal	and	common	wealth.	Such	finding	might	extend	our	understanding	about	how	
economic	actors	operating	within	economic	systems	or	institutions	create	wealth.	
Researchers	suggest	that	when	two	players	play	a	trust	game,	both	players	undertake	two	
kinds	of	strategic	deliberation.	The	first	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	trustor	faces	investment	risk.	
He	sends	an	amount	of	money	from	his	endowment	to	the	trustee	in	every	round	and	hopes	that	
the	trustee	will	honor	his	trust.	Whether	or	not	the	trustee	honors	his	trust	becomes	apparent	when	
the	trustee	makes	the	initial	repayment	(e.g.,	Ruff	and	Fehr,	2014).	Both	trustor	and	trustee	learn	
from	their	reciprocal	actions,	meaning	they	learn	to	predict	how	much	the	other	person	will	invest	
or	repay.	Based	on	this	learning,	they	decide	how	much	to	invest	or	repay,	and	the	iterative	money			
exchanges	result	in	mutual	wealth	creation.	When	the	trustee	honors	the	risk	taken	by	the	trustor,	
indicated	by	the	size	of	trustee’s	repayments,	the	striatum	in	the	trustor’s	brain	might	be	thought	to	
become	activated	(Ruff	and	Fehr,	2014).	This	type	of	activation	is	known	to	be	related	to	rewarding	
experiences	and	arises	here	perhaps	because	the	trustor	has	made	an	accurate	prediction	or	has	
noticed	that	his	expectations	have	been	exceeded.	This	consequently	motivates	the	trustor	to	invest	
even	bigger	amounts	from	his	endowments,	leading	to	substantial	earnings	for	each	round	of	this	
trust	game.	
The	second	strategic	deliberation	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	two	players	make	two	
complementary	strategic	decisions	(Hardin,	2003).	The	first	deliberation	is	trusting,	defined	as	being	
“willing	to	show	his	or	her	vulnerability	by	taking	a	risk;	e.g.,	the	trustee	will	not	benefit	from	me.”	
The	other	is	appraising	someone’s	trustworthiness,	defined	as	the	willingness	of	a	person	(the	
trustee)	to	act	favorably	toward	the	other	person	(the	trustor)	(Ben-Ner	and	Halldorsson,	2010,	p.	
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65).	It	is	the	trustee’s	responsibility	to	demonstrate	high	trustworthiness	through	his	benevolence,	
social	competence,	sense	of	obligation	to	reciprocate	the	money	being	invested	in	him,	reputation	
management,	and	consistency,	all	of	which	is	signaled	behaviorally	by	his	repaying	an	amount	of	
money	that	is	balances	or	is	greater	than	what	the	trustor	expects	to	receive	(Hardin,	2003).	Here,	
however,	the	trustee	is	never	sure	how	much	the	trustor	appraises	his	trustworthiness.	Based	on	
viewing	the	trustee’s	behavioral	signals	(repayments),	the	trustor	can	learn	to	trust	the	trustee	
through	a	“lens	of	trustworthiness”	(Hardin,	2003).	We	argue	that	this	dimension	of	trust	acquired	
through	the	lens	of	trustworthiness	affects	the	trustor’s	willingness	to	rely	on	the	trustee.	Ultimately	
this	means	that	it	takes	the	trustor	less	effort	to	make	strategic	deliberations	which	motives	or	
allows	him	to	invest	more	in	the	trustee.	Again,	this	leads	to	substantial	increases	in	earnings	for	
each	round	of	the	trust	game.	
What	strategic	deliberations	would	be	involved	when	the	two	players	play	the	trust	game	
framed	as	a	power	game?	We	conjecture	that	the	following	will	not	be	salient	deliberations	during	
the	power	game:	a)	the	trustor	showing	trust	in	the	trustee,	b)	the	trustee	honoring	the	trust	placed	
in	them,	and	c)	the	trustee	seeking	to	demonstrate	his	trustworthiness	to	the	trustor.	Rather,	we	
conjecture,	both	players	will	seek	to	outsmart	each	other	so	as	to	create	higher	wealth	for	
themselves	rather	than	mutual	wealth,	as	occurs	for	participants	in	the	trust	game.		Speaking	
strategically,	the	trustee	has	to	show	some	trustworthiness	so	as	to	keep	the	trustor	motivated	to	
continue	investing.	At	the	same	time,	however,	keeping	a	guileful	eye	on	potential	earnings,	the	
trustee	will	minimize	his	strategic	efforts	to	show	trustworthiness	and	thus	will	show	less	
benevolence,	demonstrate	less	consistency	in	repayments,	and	feel	a	less	obliged	to	reciprocate	the	
money	being	invested	in	him.	This	results	in	the	trustors’	reduced	ability	to	predict	the	amounts	
received	from	the	trustee	as	the	volatility	in	sending	repayments	will	be	higher	than	in	the	trust	
game.	In	other	words,	the	trustor	has	to	be	constantly	on	the	lookout	for	the	next	strategic	move	of	
the	trustee.	He	will	not	have	rewarding	experiences	as	a	function	of	the	trustee	honoring	his	risk-
taking	or	being	able	to	predict	the	trustee’s	repayment	decisions.	Thus,	the	trustor	focuses	on	
creating	his	own	wealth	rather	than	on	mutual	wealth.	Hence,	the	earnings	of	each	round	in	the	
power	game	will	should	be	lower	than	in	the	trust	game.	
The	main	research	question	of	our	study	is	the	following:	will	interbrain	synchronicity	be	
higher	when	the	game	is	framed	as	a	“trust	game”	compared	to	a	“power	game”?	High	interbrain	
synchronicity	is	commonly	taken	as	a	sign	of	mutual	synchronized	activity	of	the	brains	(Astolfi	et	al.,	
2010;	De	Vico	Fallani	et	al.,	2010,	Toppi	et	al.,	2016).	However,	the	reflexes	on	behavioral	decision	of	
these	synchronized	brains	activity	can	only	be	hypothesized.	For	instance,	some	authors	have	shown	
that	coherent	and	statistically	significant	interbrain	activities	were	developed	during	coordinated	
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and	supportive	behavioral	actions	between	two	or	more	team	members	(Astolfi	et	al.,	2010;	De	Vico	
Fallani	et	al.,	2010,	Toppi	et	al.,	2016).	When	the	hypothesis	about	the	predicted	activity	of	the	other	
partner(s)	became	less	stable	(e.g	not	cooperative	actions)	these	interbrain	activity	significantly	
fades.	The	same	line	of	reasoning	could	be	followed	for	brain	processes	that	subserve	tasks	that	
require	a	close	scrutiny	of	the	other	partner	when	compared	to	other	more	“independent”	behavior.	
In	particular,	tit-for-tat	task	when	compared	to	the	“defect”	task	(De	Vico	Fallani	et	al.,	2010).	
Summarizing,	evidences	from	literature	suggest	that	as	cooperative	behavior	or	intense	scrutiny	of	
the	partner	could	be	associated	with	an	increased	interbrain	activity	by	using	EEG	signals,	mainly	in	
frontoparietal	areas.	This	underlying	hypothesis	founded	on	the	previous	literature	in	the	area	will	
be	adopted	to	link	the	neuroelectrical	and	the	behavioral	responses	in	our	experiment.	
Materials	and	Method	
Participants	
The	Ethics	Commission	at	the	university	granted	permission	to	do	the	study.	The	trust	game	
was	pretested	in	three	pairs,	allowing	the	team	to	fine-tune	the	experimental	setup.	Subsequently	
the	team	began	collecting	data.	
	 As	gender	and	culture	differences	are	known	to	affect	how	people	engage	in	the	trust	game	
(Buchan	et	al.,	2008;	Croson	and	Buchan,	1999),	only	Caucasian	males	living	for	at	least	five	years	in	
Europe	were	recruited	to	participate	in	this	study.	We	designed	flyers	which	were	distributed	to	
students	walking	on	campus	or	dropped	in	the	mail	boxes	of	students	living	on	campus.	In	addition,	
the	campus	bulletin	board	system	(Euro-system)	and	Facebook	were	used	as	recruitment	tools.	The	
flyer	mentioned	that	recruits	would	be	paid	€15	for	their	participation	and	could	earn	up	to	about	
€40.	In	total	98	Caucasians,	living	in	Europe	for	at	least	five	years	were	recruited.	
All	participants	had	normal	vision	and	reported	having	no	history	of	neurological	diseases.	
Written	informed	consent	was	signed	by	all	participants	who	were	told	that	they	could	stop	with	the	
experiments	if	they	wanted	to	anytime.	They	were	randomly	matched	in	pairs	with	one	player	
assigned	as	the	trustor	and	the	other	as	trustee.	Next,	both	were	assigned	to	one	of	the	two	
conditions:	the	game	framed	as	a	“trust	game”	versus	framed	as	a	“power	game”.	Nine	pairs	were	
excluded	due	to	excessive	artifacts	in	more	than	half	of	the	epochs	or	when	it	was	discovered	that	
they	misunderstood	the	rules	of	the	game	(see	description	hereunder).	This	resulted	in	20	effective	
pairs	per	condition	(total	subjects	n=80).	The	mean	age	of	this	sample	was	22.76	and	s.d.	was	3.88.	
Design	of	Experiment	
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Two	people	were	assigned	to	be	experimenters	(A	and	B)	in	the	study,	and	another	person,	
experimenter	C,	was	the	lead	administrator	on	the	computer	equipment	during	the	experiment	(see	
Fig.	1A	of	the	experimental	setup).	Experimenter	A	always	took	the	lead	at	the	beginning	of	all	the	
rounds,	thus	securing	standardization	for	all	the	pairs.	
Place	Fig.	1	(A,	B,	C)	about	here	
Experimenter	A	invited	the	participants	to	be	seated	in	a	waiting	room	and	asked	them	to	
introduce	themselves	to	each	other.	This	introduction	served	as	a	prompt	that	during	the	game	they	
were	about	to	interact	with	a	real	person	rather	than	a	computer.	This	precaution	was	taken	
because	some	students	might	have	read	a	bit	of	game	theory	and	anticipated	that	subjects	could	
play	against	a	computer	and	not	a	real	subject.	A	toss	of	the	coin	was	used	to	assign	them	to	roles	of	
trustor	or	trustee.	They	were	then	asked	to	take	a	seat	in	one	of	two	EEG	rooms,	where	
experimenters	A	and	B	waited	to	place	the	caps	on	their	heads.	The	participants	were	always	taught	
how	to	play	the	game	in	the	same	way.	Experimenter	A	visited	each	participant	in	their	own	EEG	
room	and	gave	both	the	same	detailed	explanations	about	the	rules	and	their	respective	role.	To	
check	if	the	instructions	were	understood,	experimenter	A	asked	the	participants	to	briefly	repeat	
the	rules	and	also	posed	specific	testing	questions.	If	experimenter	A	discovered	that	the	
participants	did	not	fully	understand	the	rules,	he	explained	them	again.	But,	during	the	game,	when	
it	was	observed	that	the	participants	did	not	understand	their	role	in	the	game,	they	were	allowed	
to	continue	but	their	data	were	later	deleted	from	the	sample.	This	was	done	in	order	to	keep	the	
promise	that	they	could	earn	up	to	€40.	Then,	led	by	experimenter	C,	they	were	asked	to	play	three	
practice	rounds	on	the	computer.	This	step	ensured	that	the	participants’	mental	efforts	to	learn	the	
game	would	be	kept	to	a	minimum	during	the	actual	experiment.	After	the	instruction	phase	
researchers,	A	and	B	left	the	rooms,	closing	the	doors	behind	them,	thus	ensuring	that	the	
participants	were	alone	and	that	no	one	could	interfere	with	their	strategic	deliberations	and	
actions.	
In	the	trust	game	condition,	participants	were	told	that	the	game	was	called	the	“trust	
game”,	and	the	sentence,	“you	are	entering	a	TRUST	GAME”,	was	shown	on	the	screen	before	the	
game	started.	In	the	power	game	condition,	the	name	became,	“power	game”,	and	the	sentence,	
“you	are	entering	a	POWER	GAME”,	was	shown	on	the	screen	before	the	game	started.	Throughout	
the	explanation,	experimenter	A	never	deliberately	emphasized	the	name	of	the	game,	nor	
reminded	participants	to	pay	extra	attention	to	the	name.	Before	the	experiment	started,	
participants	were	asked	to	reflect	quietly	(resting	state)	by	looking	at	a	cross	on	the	screen.	This	step	
was	designed	to	make	them	feel	relaxed	and	prepare	themselves	for	the	actual	experiment.	
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Each	round	began	with	a	500	ms	fixation,	then	the	trustor	was	given	an	endowment	of	€	10	
and	was	asked	to	decide	how	much	he	would	like	to	send	to	the	trustee	(from	€	0	to	€	10).	
Meanwhile	the	trustee	was	prompted	to	predict	how	much	money	the	trustor	might	send.	A	blank	
screen	was	presented	for	six	seconds	while	both	participants	deliberated,	and	it	was	followed	by	a	
decision	(or	prediction)	screen.	After	the	deliberation	period,	the	players	typed	their	answers	on	a	
keypad.	Reaction	time	from	the	onset	of	decision	(or	prediction)	screen	to	button	press	was	
recorded	and	used	in	subsequent	analyses.	No	time	limit	was	imposed.	After	both	participants	
entered	in	a	value,	the	trustor’s	amount	was	tripled	and	revealed	to	both	participants	for	three	
seconds.	The	trustee’s	predictions	were	recorded	but	not	revealed	to	the	trustor.	The	trustee	then	
thought	how	much	money	to	repay	and	entered	this	amount.	Likewise,	the	trustor	predicted	the	
repayment	value	(with	his	reaction	time	also	recorded),	but	only	the	repayment	amount,	not	the	
prediction,	was	shown	to	both	players	for	three	seconds.	The	game	consisted	of	15	rounds,	which	
was	referred	to	vaguely	as	“several	rounds”	in	the	instruction	phase	(see	Fig.	1B	&	C).	Each	
participant	earned	€	15	of	their	promised	participation	fee	and	5%	of	their	total	earnings	from	the	
game	was	converted	into	cash.	At	the	end	of	the	game	each	participant	could	see	the	total	
accumulated	earnings	on	the	screen.	
EEG	Hyperscanning	Setup	and	Data	Acquisition	
Simultaneous	 stimuli	 presentation	and	EEG	 signal	 recording	were	manipulated	 via	 E-prime	
port	 communication	 (see	 Fig.	 1A).	 Two	BioSemi	 32-channel	 elastic	 head	 caps	 connected	with	 two	
separate,	identical	amplifiers	(BioSemi	Active-Two	system	AD-box)	were	used	to	collect	brain	signals	
from	both	participants.	EEG	signals	were	continuously	digitized	and	recorded	at	a	sampling	rate	of	512	
Hz,	24-bit	A/D	conversion.	Two	active	electrodes	attached	to	the	left	and	right	mastoids	were	selected	
as	reference	electrodes.	Vertical	electro-oculogram	(VEOG)	and	horizontal	electro-oculogram	(HEOG)	
were	recorded	by	pasting	two	active	electrodes	below	and	above	the	left	eye,	and	to	the	orbital	rim	
of	both	eyes.	Electrode	impedance	was	reduced	to	a	low	level	(5	kΩ)	before	the	formal	experiment	
began	and	was	maintained	for	all	recordings.	
Before	the	calculation	of	synchronicity,	EEG	data	were	pre-processed	adopting	BrainVision	
Analyzer	2	(Brain	Products,	Gilching,	Germany)	offline	in	order	to	clean	the	data	and	remove	the	
artifacts.	First,	EEG	data	were	filtered	with	a	0.1-45Hz	bandpass	filter	as	well	as	a	60 Hz	notch	filter.	
Next,	data	were	re-referenced	to	the	average	of	the	left	and	right	mastoids.	Then,	an	independent	
component	analysis	provided	by	Brain	Vision	Analyzer2	was	adopted	to	remove	the	artifacts	caused	
by	ocular	movements.	Ocular-free	EEG	data	were	segmented	from	1s	before	deliberation	onset	to	
the	end	of	deliberation	period	(-1s-6s)	in	the	first	and	second	deliberation	period,	resulting	in	300	
epochs	per	phase	per	condition.	Finally,	bad	epochs	were	removed	based	on	the	max-min	criterion.	
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In	particular,	to	ensure	both	roles	had	the	same	number	of	epochs,	if	the	epoch	was	excluded	from	
trustor	EEG	dataset,	the	corresponding	epoch	was	also	excluded	from	the	trustee	dataset,	and	vice	
versa.	Consistent	with	previous	hyperscanning	research	by	with	Mu	et	al.	(2017),	representative	
electrodes	were	selected	as	electrodes	of	interest	in	accordance	with	four	ROIs:	frontal	(F3,	Fz,	F4),	
central	(C3,	Cz,	C4),	parietal	(P3,	Pz,	P4)	and	occipital	(O1,	Oz,	O2).	
EEG	Time-frequency	analyses		
	 Similar	to	EEG	hyperscanning	studies	(e.g.,	Jahng	et	al.,	2017),	time-frequency	analyses	were	
conducted	to	characterize	neural	activities	during	the	task	and	test	the	framing	effect	on	event-
related	spectral	perturbation	(ERSP).	Artifacts-free	epochs	from	1s	before	deliberation	onset	to	6s	
after	onset	were	extracted	and	went	into	time-frequency	analyses.	ERSP	calculations	were	done	in	
EEGLAB.	Default	cycles	[3	0.8]	was	adopted.	The	frequency	range	were	set	from	4	to	40Hz,	including	
all	frequency	bands	we	are	interested	in.	1s	prior	to	the	deliberation	onset	was	determined	as	
baseline	of	calculating	spectral	power.	A	bootstrap	method	with	1000	times	replicates	was	used	at	
every	timepoint	in	every	time	frequency	band	in	order	to	compare	the	ERSP	magnitudes	in	trust	
game	and	power	game	during	the	whole	deliberation	period.	
Interbrain	Synchronicity	Calculation	
Consistent	with	previous	EEG	hyperscanning	studies	based	on	epochs,	the	sample	size	of	this	
study	is	adequate	to	calculate	the	neural	synchronicity	(e.g.,	Jahng	et	al.,	2017;	Pérez	et	al.,	2017).	
The	interbrain	synchronicity	between	the	trustor	and	trustee	was	reflected	by	phase-locking	value	
(PLV)	(Lachaux	et	al.,	1999)	for	all	combinations	of	the	selected	electrodes.	The	trial	based	PLV	of	
electrode	pair	(i,	j)	was	defined	as	(Burgess,	2013;	Delaherche	et	al.,	2015;	Pérez	et	al.,	2017):	
𝑃𝐿𝑉$% = 1𝑁 𝑒𝑥𝑝$(-. / 0-1 / )3/45 	
where	N	is	the	number	of	time	points	in	each	time	window.	Phase	difference	at	each	time	point	𝜑$ 𝑡 − 𝜑% 𝑡 	was	estimated	using	Hilbert	Transform	in	the	following	four	frequency	bands:	theta	
(5–7	Hz),	alpha	(8–13	Hz),	beta	(14–18	Hz)	and	gamma	(28-40	Hz)	at	six	time	ranges	of	the	thinking	
phase	(0–1s,	1–2s,	2–3s,	3–4s,	4–5s	and	5–6s).	The	PLV	ranges	from	0	to	1,	where	0	means	no	
interbrain	synchronicity,	while	1	indicates	perfect	synchronicity	of	the	oscillations	between	two	
signals.	In	order	to	rule	out	coincidental	synchronicity,	for	each	electrode	combination	(i	and	j),	real	
PLVrealij	and	500	PLVsurrogateij	obtained	by	surrogating	the	trials	of	electrode	j	and	calculating	the	
phase-locking	value	of	i	and	shuffled	j	were	compared.	Phase-locking	statistics	(PLS)	was	defined	as	
the	sum	of	shuffled	PLVsurrogateij	exceeding	the	real	PLVrealij.	If	PLS	<	5%,	the	original	real	PLV	was	kept,	
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otherwise	(PLS	≥	5%),	PLV	was	set	to	0.	Only	significant	(non-zero)	PLVs	went	into	further	statistical	
analyses.	PLVs	of	symmetric	electrode	pairs	were	then	averaged.	Specifically,	the	average	value	
between	𝑃𝐿𝑉$% 	and	𝑃𝐿𝑉%$ 	was	calculated	as	the	synchronicity	between	electrode	i	and	electrode	j	
(Jahng	et	al.,	2017).	
Results	
Behavioral	Results	
Earnings	Each	Round	
A	2	(condition:	trust	game	and	power	game)	x	2	(role:	trustor	and	trustee)	repeated	
measures	ANOVA	was	used	to	explore	the	framing	and	role	effect	on	earnings	for	each	round.	The	
salient	effects	of	both	factors	were	found	(condition:	F	(1,598)	=	3.984,	p	=	0.046;	role:	F	(1,598)	=	
8.021,	p	=	0.005),	indicating	that	participants	earned	more	money	in	the	trust	game	(M=13.563)	than	
in	the	power	game	(M=13.067),	and	the	trustor	(M=13.647)	earned	more	money	than	the	trustee	
(M=12.983).	However,	no	significant	interaction	between	condition	and	role	was	observed	(F	(1,598)	
=	1.752,	p	=	0.186)	(Fig.	2).	
Place	about	Fig.	2	here	
Reaction	Time	
Participant’s	reaction	time,	defined	as	the	duration	from	the	onset	of	the	answer	screen	to	
the	button	press,	after	thinking	about	their	predictions	and	decisions	on	how	much	to	invest/repay	
was	analyzed	to	explore	the	differences	between	two	conditions.	Outliers	falling	outside	the	range	
mean±2*standard	deviation	were	excluded	before	the	2	(phase:	invest	phase	and	repay	phase)	x	2	
(role:	trustor	and	trustee)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	in	two	conditions.	In	the	trust	
game,	the	statistical	result	confirmed	a	significant	phase	x	role	interaction	effect	(F	(1,265)	=	8.884,	p	
=	0.003).	Specifically,	in	both	phases,	the	trustee	had	a	longer	reaction	time	than	the	trustor	(invest	
phase:	Mtrustor-trustee	=	-859.177,	t	=	-5.477,	p	<	0.001;	repay	phase:	Mtrustor-trustee	=	-
1409.951,	t	=	-10.040,	p	<	0.001)	(Fig.	3A).	The	results	indicated	that	it	always	took	the	trustee	longer	
to	answer,	no	matter	whether	he	was	asked	to	decide	or	predict.	In	the	power	game,	a	significant	
phase	x	role	interaction	effect	(F	(1,260)	=	38.327,	p	<	0.001)	on	reaction	time	was	also	revealed.	
Unlike	in	the	trust	game,	the	trustor	in	the	power	game	spent	longer	deciding	on	the	amount	of	
money	to	invest	than	the	trustee	spent	predicting	how	much	he	would	receive	(Mtrustor-trustee	=	
431.394,	t	=	2.779,	p	=	0.006),	while	in	the	repay	phase,	it	took	the	trustee	longer	to	decide	how	
much	to	repay	than	the	trustor	to	predict	how	much	to	receive	(Mtrustor-trustee	=	-1322.364,	t	=	-
5.163,	p	<	0.001)	(Fig.	3B).	
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Place	Fig.	3	(A,	B)	about	here	
Prediction	Accuracy	
Prediction	accuracy	is	reflected	by	the	absolute	difference	between	predicting	how	much	to	
receive/repay	and	deciding	the	amount	of	money	to	send/repay,	which	means	that	the	greater	the	
difference	between	the	predicted	amount	received/repaid	and	the	real	amount	sent/repaid,	the	
lower	the	prediction	accuracy.	The	results	of	a	2	(condition:	trust	game	and	power	game)	x	2	(phase:	
invest	phase	and	repay	phase)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	the	pronounced	main	effects	of	
both	condition	(F	(1,	1196)	=	4.998,	p	=	0.026)	and	phase	(F	(1,	1196)	=	7.825,	p	=	0.005),	indicating	
that	participants	predicted	more	accurately	about	the	exchanged	amount	of	money	in	the	trust	
game	compared	to	the	power	game	(Mtrust	=	1.227;	Mpower	=	1.557),	and	trustors	did	better	than	
trustee	in	money	prediction	no	matter	the	condition	(Minvest	=	1.598;	Mrepay	=	1.185).	No	
significant	interaction	effect	between	condition	and	phase	was	observed	based	on	the	ANOVA	
results	(p	=	0.095)	(Fig.	4).	
Place	Fig.	4	about	here	
EEG	Time-frequency	Results	
In	order	to	gauge	interbrain	synchronicity	we	first	conduct	a	time-frequency	analysis	(Jahng	
et	al.	2017).		Significant	differences	(p	<=	0.001)	were	shown	with	blue,	while	insignificant	ones	were	
shown	as	yellow	(Fig.	5).	Greater	brain	activities	of	power	game	versus	trust	game	were	found	in	
alpha	and	gamma	band	at	1-2s	time	interval,	beta	and	gamma	band	at	2-3s	time	interval	as	well	as	
3-4s	time	interval.	Besides,	brain	activities	were	observed	to	be	greater	only	in	alpha	band	at	4-5s	
time	interval.	Baseline	and	5-6s	time	interval	were	cut	short	after	the	time-frequency	transformation	
and	didn’t	go	into	statistical	analyses.		Based	on	time-frequency	analyses,	we	aimed	to	test	how	
framing	effect	modulated	ERSP	manipulates	in	different	frequency	bands	at	different	time	intervals.		
Place	Fig.5	about	here		
		
Interbrain	Synchronicity	
We	calculated	the	interbrain	synchronicity	from	frequency	bands	and	time	intervals	which	
showed	significant	ERSP	magnitude	differences	between	trust	game	and	power	game.	
PLVs	ranged	from	0	to	1	were	used	to	measure	the	connectivity	between	two	brains	across	
time	and	averaged	based	on	brain	regions	for	further	analyses.	As	the	missions	in	both	invest	and	
repay	phases	were	similar,	except	that	the	decider	in	the	invest	phase	turned	into	a	predictor	in	
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repay	phase,	we	first	ran	a	t-test	for	PLVs	from	the	invest	and	repay	phases	within	a	1-2s	time	
window	to	test	the	differences	between	two	phases.	The	false	discovery	rate	(FDR)	procedure	was	
adopted	to	correct	the	p-values	for	multiple	comparisons.	No	significant	difference	was	observed	in	
any	of	the	electrode	combinations	(corrected	p	>	0.05).	PLVs	from	these	two	phases	were	then	
merged	and	went	into	the	comparison	between	conditions.	Mixed	ANOVA	was	adopted	in	all	
frequency	bands,	with	condition	(trust	vs.	power	game)	as	a	between-subject	factor	and	electrode	
combination	(78	combinations)	as	a	within-subject	factor.	Salient	effect	of	condition	(F	(1,	1066)	=	
4.736,	p	=	0.032)	was	observed	only	in	the	alpha	band	(1-2s)	(see	Table	1).	Interaction	effect	
between	channels	and	condition	appeared	only	in	beta	band	at	3-4s	time	interval.	However,	further	
t-test	with	FDR	correction	showed	almost	no	significant	channel	combinations	of	the	interaction	
effect,	so	only	the	salient	condition	effect	in	alpha	band	was	plotted	and	went	into	discussion.	Fig.	6	
illustrates	that	alpha	band	PLV	(1-2s)	was	substantially	higher	in	the	power	game	than	the	trust	
game.	Subsequent	independent	t-test	revealed	the	framing	effect	in	different	electrode	
combinations	(FDR	corrected).	These	significant	electrode	combinations	were	mainly	in	the	
prefrontal	and	central	regions	(Fig.	7).	
Place	Table	1	about	here	
	
							Place	Fig.	6	about	here	
	
									Place	Fig.	7	about	here	
	
Discussion	
Trust	between	economic	actors	is	a	key	factor	in	society	and	affects	whether	and	how	
economic	actors	can	build	wealth	in	a	world	in	which	people	can	compete	or	cooperate	(Ostrom	and	
Walker,	2003).	The	iterative	trust	game	is	a	prolifically	used	tool	that	exemplifies	how	participants	
(two	economic	actors)	learn	about	each	other’s	economic	strategies	and	build	trust	accordingly,	and	
how	this	in	turn	effects	wealth	creation.	We	studied	the	strategic	deliberations	that	both	
participants	made	as	well	as	their	interbrain	synchronicity	which	deepens	our	understanding	of	how	
people	engage	in	wealth	creation.	Based	on	the	knowledge	that	trust	games	are	sensitive	to	design	
factors	such	as	framing	effects,	we	framed	the	economic	experiment	as	a	“trust	game”	and	“power	
game”.	We	conjectured	that	this	framing	effect	would	substantially	affect	the	strategic	deliberations	
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of	both	the	trustor	and	the	trustee	and	would	be	associated	with	differences	in	EEG	time	frequency	
results	and	in	interbrain	synchronicity.	
Briefly	stated:	in	the	trust	game	the	trustor	will	mainly	test	the	trustee	because	a)	as	the	
trustor	faces	more	risk	he	needs	to	study	the	trustee	to	predict	whether	the	trustee	will	repay	his	
investments;	b)	when	his	predictions	about	the	trustee	are	correct	or	exceeded	(more	money	is	
repaid	than	predicted)	the	trustor	will	experience	feelings	of	reward;	and	c)	the	trustor	will	view	the	
repayment	decisions	through	the	lens	of	the	trustee’s	trustworthiness.	These	strategic	deliberations	
affect	his	willingness	to	rely	on	the	trustee	and	make	investment	decisions	accordingly,	all	of	which	
result	in	creating	both	his	own	wealth	as	well	as	their	collective	wealth.	The	roles	substantially	
change	in	the	power	game	because	now,	in	their	deliberations,	both	players	behave	antagonistically	
as	they	seek	or	are	required	to	outsmart	each	other	and	thus	keep	a	strategic	eye	on	creating	their	
own	wealth	rather	than	on	collecting	mutual	wealth.	
The	experiment	delivered	three	important	observations.	First,	as	expected	the	earnings	of	
each	round	were	higher	in	the	trust	game	than	in	the	power	game.	Note	that	the	trustor	benefited	
mostly	from	wealth	creation	in	either	condition	and	the	framing	(trust	vs.	power)	of	the	game	had	
no	effect	on	either	the	roles	taken	or	wealth	creation.	In	other	words,	the	data	show	that	the	trustor	
was	the	main	beneficiary,	no	matter	the	framing	condition.	
Second,	the	reaction	time	taken	to	ponder	about	deciding	and	predicting	investments	or	
repayments	showed	different	patterns	in	both	games.	In	the	trust	game,	the	trustee	took	longer	
than	the	trustor	to	predict	both	how	much	money	he	would	receive	and	how	much	he	would	repay.	
However,	in	the	power	game,	the	trustee	only	took	longer	deliberating	on	how	much	to	repay	while	
the	trustor	took	more	time	to	decide	how	much	to	invest	in	the	trustee.	
Third,	the	prediction	accuracy	was	higher	in	the	trust	game	than	the	power	game.	In	other	
words,	as	we	proposed,	better	prediction	brings	about	more	trust	and	a	greater	sense	of	reward,	
which	results	in	the	willingness	to	make	higher	investments.	Note,	however,	that	in	both	the	trust	
and	power	games,	the	trustor	was	better	at	predicting	the	repayments	made.	In	addition,	no	
interaction	effects	(condition	and	role)	were	found.	
All	observations	(higher	earnings	for	each	round	of	the	trust	game,	longer	reaction	time	for	
the	trustee	in	the	invest/repay	phase	of	the	trust	game,	higher	prediction	accuracy	in	the	trust	game	
and	better	prediction	accuracy	by	the	trustor	no	matter	what	game	or	condition)	lead	us	to	
conjecture	that	in	the	trust	game	the	trustee	takes	more	responsibility	for	ensuring	that	trust	builds	
between	the	players	such	that	more	common	wealth	can	be	created.	In	contrast,	in	the	power	game	
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the	trustor’s	longer	reaction	time	for	investment	decisions	and	better	prediction	accuracy	for	
repayments	indicates	that	he	might	devise	a	strategic	mindset	to	gain	more	wealth	on	the	back	of	
the	goodwill	of	the	trustee,	given	that	the	latter’s	repayment	reaction	time	was	longer	than	the	
trustor’s	prediction	reaction	time.		
In	short,	these	observations	lead	us	to	conclude	that	the	economic	game	framed	as	a	trust	
game	versus	power	game	substantially	affects	people’s	strategic	deliberations.	Importantly,	it	allows	
us	to	understand	our	findings	on	the	differences	in	interbrain	synchronicity	between	the	two	games.	
In	the	trust	game,	the	trustee	takes	longer	to	think	about	both	the	investment	received	and	the	
repayment	sum	to	be	sent	to	the	trustor.	Added	to	that,	the	trustor’s	better	prediction	accuracy	
about	the	repayments	allow	him	to	rely	on	the	trustee	as	well	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	having	
his	trust	honored	and	being	able	to	appraise	the	trustee	through	the	lens	of	trustworthiness.	
However,	when	framed	as	a	power	game,	the	way	in	which	both	players	deliberated	
strategically	changed	substantially:	the	trustor	spent	more	time	deciding	how	much	to	invest	so	as	
attain	higher	earnings	himself	while	the	trustee	had	to	keep	the	game	going,	in	terms	of	both	
wondering	“how	much	will	I	get?”	to	a	certain	extent,	due	to	the	trustor’s	intense	strategizing,	and	in	
thinking	strategically	about	how	much	to	repay.	This	showed	up	especially	in	the	lower	prediction	
accuracy	in	the	power	game	as	opposed	to	the	trust	game.	Both	accounts	of	strategic	deliberations	
the	trust	and	power	games	help	us	explain	why	interbrain	synchronicity	was	higher	in	the	power	
game	than	in	the	trust	game.	This	finding,	we	believe,	is	our	contribution	to	the	literature	on	
interbrain	synchronicity	which	has	become	an	important	stream	of	research	today	given	that	the	
human	base	line	has	a	rich	social	foundation	rather	than	merely	reflecting	individuality	in	an	
observer	or	appraiser	of	facial	expressions	of	conspecifics	(e.g.,	Babiloni	and	Astolfi,	2014;	Dumas	et	
al.,	2010).	
As	discussed,	the	strategic	deliberations	of	trustor	and	trustee	performed	key	roles	in	the	
trust	game	and	so	these	periods	were	chosen	to	measure	interbrain	synchronicity.	A	closer	look	at	
the	differences	in	interbrain	synchronicity	between	the	two	conditions	shows	that	they	occurred	
especially	between	the	electrodes	in	frontal	and	central	regions.	These	regions	are	associated	with	
prefrontal	activation,	and	this	in	turn	is	known	to	be	involved	in	human	decision-making	(Miller	and	
Cohen,	2001;	Tang	et	al.,	2015).	Several	authors	have	proposed	that	when	people	deliberate	
strategically	in	economic	games,	their	prefrontal	cortex	activations	play	key	roles	(e.g.,	Sanfey,	
2003).	Concretely,	these	strategic	deliberations	involve	perspective-taking	or	theory	of	mind	
inferences,	when	predicting	how	much	money	to	receive	or,	particularly	applicable	to	the	trustee,	
the	suppression	of	overly	selfish	behavior	(Balconi	and	Pagani,	2014;	Ruby	and	Decety,	2004).	
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Apparently	these	strategic	deliberations	are	more	synchronous	during	the	power	game	than	in	the	
trust	game.	Again,	during	the	power	game	both	participants	were	seeking	to	outsmart	each	other,	
which	requires	intense	perspective-taking	efforts,	while	in	the	trust	game	the	trustor	can	rely	on	the	
trustworthiness	of	the	trustee,	whom	we	believe	undertook	more	effort	to	show	his	trustworthiness	
or	refrain	from	being	opportunistic.	Hence	these	interbrain	synchronicity	findings	match	well	with	
the	main	conjectures	made	in	our	paper.	Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	interbrain	synchronicity	
takes	place	at	the	alpha	bands	which	are	known	to	be	related	to	social	strategic	deliberations	(e.g.,	
Tognoli	et	al.,	2007;	Astolfi	et	al.,	2010).	
It	may	seem	counter-intuitive	that	interbrain	synchronicity	is	higher	in	the	power	game	than	
the	trust	game.	After	all,	friendships	and	other	relationships	between	people	are	known	to	show	
high	interbrain	synchronicity	(Goldstein et al., 2018).	Note,	however,	that	interpersonal	relationships	
function	to	provide	all	partners	in	the	relationship	affection,	pleasure,	and	stress	relief.	Here	we	
must	emphasize	that	in	the	economic	game	under	study	both	players	face	high	opportunity	costs	if	
their	strategic	deliberations	do	not	benefit	each	other.	One	or	both	face	a	loss	of	money	if	they	do	
not	learn	about	the	other	person’s	strategy,	or	whether	they	can	rely	on	the	other	person’s	trust,	
which	is	especially	the	case	for	the	trustor.	Concretely,	in	our	experiment	they	can	lose	or	earn	
about	€40,	a	significant	amount	for	most	students,	especially	given	the	short	period	of	time	needed	
to	complete	the	experiment	and	their	low	student	budget.	Of	course,	beyond	monetary	gain,	pride	
and	reputation	are	also	rewarding.	
Although	this	may	be	a	leap	of	faith,	we	cannot	refrain	from	pondering	that	the	trustee	in	
the	trust	game	also	functions	much	like	a	banker	who	has	to	take	responsibility	for	his	customers’	
trust	that	his	bank	is	a	reliable	place	to	invest	their	money	in.	Ultimately,	trustworthiness	between	
economic	actors,	such	as	two	individuals	or	an	individual’s	interaction	with	an	institution,	and	the	
consequent	effort	to	demonstrate	trustworthiness	by	individuals,	firms	or	institutions	are	what	
foster	common	wealth	creation	in	society	(Fukuyama,	1995).	Again,	our	conclusions	are	inferred	
especially	from	our	study	of	interbrain	synchronicity:	in	the	power	game	both	players	work	to	
outsmart	each	other	and	thus	show	high	interbrain	synchronicity,	while	in	the	trust	game	the	trustee	
allows	the	trustor	to	rely	on	him	(i.e.,	trust	him)	and	this	shows	up	in	lower	interbrain	synchronicity.	
Limitations	of	the	Study	
This	study	focused	on	two	related	questions:	does	framing	an	economic	game	influence	how	
trustor	and	trustee	engage	in	strategic	deliberations	and	how	in	turn	does	this	relate	to	differences	
in	interbrain	synchronicity	based	on	hyper	EEG.	Other	hyperscanning	techniques	are	available	these	
days,	such	as	hyperscanning	fMRI	(e.g.,	Hasson	et	al.,	2012).	This	study	could	be	replicated	using	the	
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latter	neuroscientific	method.	Indeed,	we	could	have	chosen	to	use	hyperscanning	fMRI	or	even	
both	methods	to	study	whether	the	trustor	has	higher	activation	in	his	striatum	when	the	trustee	
honors	his	investments	or	matches	his	predictions	in	the	trust	game.	Indeed,	while	EEG	has	much	to	
offer	in	studies	of	temporal	resolution	it	has	less	value	in	spatial	resolution,	whereas	fMRI	offers	just	
the	opposite	benefits.	EEG,	however,	is	more	convenient	and	less	expensive	to	implement.	
Second,	in	this	study	the	participants	were	seated	in	two	different	rooms	and	could	not	see	
each	other’s	faces.	Yet	facial	expression	is	known	to	affect	people’s	strategic	deliberations	(e.g.,	
Scharlemann	et	al.,	2001).	These	days,	with	the	availability	of	mobile	hyper	EEG	(e.g.,	EMOTIV),	it	is	
in	principle	possible	to	study	economic	games	when	people	are	in	close	proximity	with	each	other	
(Babiloni	and	Astolfi,	2014	for	an	overview).	
Third,	the	participants	in	the	experiment	were	limited	to	Caucasian	males	and	excluded	
females	and	people	from	other	ethnic	backgrounds	(e.g.,	Asians,	blacks)	or	cultural	backgrounds	
(North/South	America,	East	Europe).	Actually,	these	variables	could	significantly	influence	strategic	
deliberations	during	the	game	(Ben-Ner	and	Halldorsson,	2010).	Future	replications	should	create	a	
variety	of	strategically	chosen	stratified	samples	(e.g.,	placing	a	male	and	female	together	or	placing	
people	from	different	cultural	backgrounds	together)	in	order	to	check	whether	these	variables	
could	influence	the	effect	of	framing	on	strategic	deliberation	and	interbrain	synchronicity	found	in	
our	research.	
Fourth,	as	it	becomes	more	easy	to	use	biomarkers	such	as	hormones	or	genetic	markers	we	
could	have	studied	whether	e.g.,	participants	produce	more	testosterone	in	the	power	game	as	
opposed	to	the	trust	game	(e.g.,	Zak,	et	al.,	2009)	or	whether	individual	genetic	makeup	matters	
(e.g.,	Cesarini	et	al.,	2008).	Most	importantly,	we	could	have	studied	whether	the	endocrine	or	
genetic	variables	are	associated	with	interbrain	synchronicity.	
Conclusions	
Our	study	focused	on	how	framing	an	economic	game	as	a	“trust	game”	versus	“power	
game”	affects	the	strategic	deliberations	of	trustor	and	trustee	and	how	this	in	turn	is	associated	
with	differences	in	interbrain	synchronicity.	While	cooperation	is	intuitively	associated	with	higher	
interbrain	synchronicity,	here	we	find	that	when	people	play	the	economic	game	framed	as	a	power	
game,	interbrain	synchronicity	is	higher	than	when	framed	as	a	trust	game.	The	main	lesson	that	can	
be	drawn	from	this	finding	is	that	the	trust	emerging	between	players	in	a	trust	game,	indicated	by	
higher	earnings	for	each	round,	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	trustee	engages	in	more	intense	strategic	
deliberation	efforts	to	imbue	trust	in	the	game,	and	the	trustor	is	able	to	rely	on	this	trust	with	less	
need	for	ongoing	monitoring	reflected	in	additional	synchronicity.	This	especially	benefits	the	trustor	
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who,	as	he	can	rely	on	the	trustee	will	therefore	attain	better	prediction	accuracy	about	repayments.	
It	also	motivates	him	to	invest	(more)	in	the	trustee;	hence	the	occurrence	of	lower	interbrain	
synchronicity.	In	the	power	game,	however,	both	actors	seek	to	outsmart	each	other	which	
paradoxically	affects	their	interbrain	synchronicity	positively,	largely	due	to	greater	need	for	joint	
vigilance	concerning	each	other.	
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List	of	tables.		
	
Frequency	band		 Time	interval		 Between-subject	
effects	
Interactions	of	condition	×	
electrode	
alpha	(8–13	Hz)		 1-2s	
4-5s	
p	=	0.032	(*)	
p	=	0.666	
p	=	0.717	
p	=	0.172	
beta	(14–18	Hz)	 2-3s	
3-4s	
p	=	0.155	
p	=	0.145	
p	=	0.661	
p	=	0.001(*)	
gamma	(28-40	Hz)	 1-2s	
2-3s	
3-4s	
p	=	0.306	
p	=	0.846	
p	=	0.968	
p	=	0.583	
p	=	0.494	
p	=	0.465	
Table	1.	Between-subject	effects	and	interactions	of	condition	×	electrode	pair	in	all	
frequency	rounds	within	1-2s	time	window	(*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001).	
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C	 	
Fig.	1.	(A)	Setup	of	the	experiment;	(B)	Timeline	of	one	round	for	the	trustor;	(C)	Timeline	of	
one	round	for	the	trustee.	
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Fig.	2.	Earnings	of	each	round	in	trust	vs.	power	game	(*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001).	
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A	 	
B	 	
Fig.	3.	(A)	Reaction	time	of	trustor	and	trustee	in	the	trust	game;	(B)	Reaction	time	of	trustor	and	
trustee	in	the	power	game	(*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001).	
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Fig.	4.	Prediction	accuracy	in	the	trust	vs.	power	game	(*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001).	
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Fig.	5.	ERSP	magnitudes	in	trust	game	vs.	power	game,	separately,	differences	between	two	games	
and	significant	statistical	difference	(alpha	level	0.001)	
	
	
	
Fig.	6.	Average	PLV	in	trust	vs.	power	game	(*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001).	
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Fig.	7.	Differences	in	alpha	band	interbrain	synchronicity	(corrected	p	<	0.05).	
	
